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Abstract 
While the performance evaluation of judges has become a ubiquitous aspect of 
modern judicial administration, evaluation mechanisms of are too often utilised 
uncritically, without reflection on why we evaluate judges, and how ‘measurement’ 
furthers these objectives. This article provides a conceptual analysis of the role and 
purpose of performance evaluation, conceiving it as a limited tool of judicial 
accountability, which itself exists only to promote excellent judging. As such, the 
efficacy of evaluation mechanisms must always be assessed by reference to their 
impact on these overarching accountability objectives. The article explores the 
value of this conception approach by briefly examining three uses of performance 
evaluation: 1) judicial promotions; 2) judicial retention elections; and 3) judicial 
professional development. In doing so it illustrates how a clear conceptual approach 
invites a more nuanced and critical examination of the limitations and benefits of 
judicial performance evaluation programs. 
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Judicial performance evaluation; judicial theory; judges; judicial method; judicial 
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Resumen 
Mientras que la evaluación del rendimiento de los jueces se ha convertido en un 
aspecto omnipresente de la administración judicial moderna, los mecanismos de 
evaluación se utilizan con demasiada frecuencia de manera acrítica, sin reflexionar 
sobre las razones por las que evaluamos a los jueces, y cómo se alcanzan los 
objetivos buscados mediante la 'medición'. Este artículo ofrece un análisis 
conceptual de la función y el propósito de la evaluación del rendimiento, 
concibiéndola como una herramienta limitada de la responsabilidad judicial, que a 
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su vez sólo existe para promover la excelencia judicial. Como tal, la eficacia de los 
mecanismos de evaluación siempre se debe comprobar en función de su impacto en 
los objetivos de responsabilidad globales. El artículo explora el valor de este 
enfoque examinando brevemente tres usos de la evaluación de rendimiento: 1) 
promociones judiciales; 2) elecciones para la reelección de jueces; y 3) el desarrollo 
profesional judicial. Al hacerlo, se refleja cómo un enfoque conceptual claro invita a 
un examen más matizado y crítico de las limitaciones y beneficios de los programas 
de evaluación del rendimiento judicial. 
Palabras clave 
Evaluación del rendimiento judicial; teoría judicial; jueces; método judicial; 
elecciones a la reelección de jueces; promoción judicial 
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1. Introduction 
The evaluation of judicial performance of judges is, in one sense, a deeply familiar 
and traditional aspect of the practice of law. The lawyer advising the client whether 
to appeal, the academic analysing the latest Supreme Court decision and even, 
rarely, the Parliament considering the potential disciplining of a judge, are all 
engaged in a form of evaluating judicial performance. To the modern judicial 
scholar, however, the term ‘judicial performance evaluation’ has taken on a new 
and highly particularised usage, referring to refer to a distinct and discrete tool of 
judicial administration: the systematic survey and measurement of judicial 
performance. This accountability tool has, intriguingly, emerged as something of a 
juridical universal. The language of ‘judicial performance evaluation’ is familiar to 
judicial scholars across common law and civil law jurisdictions, as evidenced by the 
workshop from which this journal volume evolved. Despite the diverse judicial 
milieu from which participants were drawn, it was largely taken for granted that a 
conversation on the modern practice and implications of judicial performance 
evaluation was possible, and indeed unremarkable. The language of ‘judicial 
performance evaluation’ was taken to convey a discrete and definite meaning, 
referring to a distinct tool of judicial administration.1  
This new tool has become popular with judicial administrators and politicians, keen 
to ensure that judicial officers and institutions achieve administrative efficiency and 
are properly held to account. However, the use of this tool is often highly 
controversial - critics have concern over the potential of the tool to undermine 
judicial independence and impartiality, distorting decision-making. The judiciary has 
been hesitant about, if not outright hostile to, any systemic approach to assess or 
evaluate judges (See Brennan et al. 1986, p. 77).2 This controversial nature is 
evident in the extraordinary cautionary tale of Riddel et al. (2012) who were forced 
to twice abandon well-conceived empirical studies into judicial performance 
evaluation following a sustained outcry and refusal to cooperate from both the 
judiciary and the profession. There is legitimate concern that systematic 
evaluations may become a tool for executive interference (Colbran 2002b, p. 248). 
Judiciaries around the world are increasingly being placed under mounting 
pressure, through tightening budget, emboldened politicians and media increasingly 
willing to attack the judiciary (Brandenburg 2009, p. 371).3 This has been 
exacerbated by a public clamour for more judicial accountability in many 
jurisdictions (Feltner 2008, p. 177)4 and by academic critique of traditional 
accountability mechanisms (See Colbran 2003b). In such a context it should not be 
surprising that there will be resistance to any proposed new form of accountability. 
Judicial performance evaluation is not, however, simply another form of 
accountability, but rather has become the focal point for many of these debates. 
Proponents argue that judicial performance evaluation is a veritable wonder-drug, 
allowing meaningful accountability while protecting judicial independence (See 
Sponzo 1987, Brody 2000, 2008, White 2002, 2009, Colbran 2002b, Kourlis and 
Singer 2007, Haines 2010). It is seen as: a valuable aid to judicial professional 
development; creating more open judiciaries; making courts more financially 
transparent; motivating judges to be more productive; enhancing democratic 
engagement; and providing objective means of promoting judges (Colbran 2003b, 
Warren 2011, Riedel 2014, Berch and Bass 2014). Critics, however, argue that 
judicial performance evaluation threatens judicial independence and creates 
                                                 
1 For a useful discussion of the concept and context of judicial performance evaluation, see the article of 
Roach Anleu and Mack (2014, p. 1018-1020) in this volume.  
2 This hostility has been particularly evident in the common law world, though as Mohr and Contini 
(2007, p. 10, 23) note, it is clearly evident in civil systems as well. 
3 For a description of some of the extraordinary and outrageous attempts to intimidate judges in the last 
20 years in the USA, see Brandenburg (2009, p. 377-379). 
4 Tellingly, Feltner observes that this clamour arises despite that fact that the ‘public sometimes does not 
seem to be quite sure of what kind of accountability they mean, or of what precise problems require 
more accountability’ (Feltner 2008, p. 177). 
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opportunities for undue executive interference; undermines impartiality and distorts 
decision-making; misconceives the role of the judiciary; improperly favours 
measurable indicators over evaluative criteria; it improperly imports fashions of 
managerialism; is biased against minorities; is expensive, time-consuming and 
ultimately counter-productive (Griffin 1995, Mohr et al. 1996, Drummond 2001a, 
2001b, Spigelman 2002, 2006, Contini and Mohr 2007, Rares 2011, Elek et al. 
2012, Gill 2012, ).  
The appropriateness and proper scope of judicial performance evaluation is 
inherently contested ground. This is particularly so given that while the 
mechanisms of judicial performance evaluation are now deeply familiar to judicial 
studies scholars, very little is written about precisely what the concept captures, or 
what are its proper purposes or limits. The lack of conceptual analysis of judicial 
performance evaluation has meant that critics and proponents often seem to be 
talking at cross purposes. This article addresses this conceptual deficit by providing 
a theoretical framework5 to understand the purpose, scope and limits of judicial 
performance evaluation. Rather than focusing on the qualities that performance 
evaluation can measure, I address the anterior issues of why measure at all. I 
argue that the term ‘judicial performance evaluation’ has come to represent a 
particular form of evaluation that relies upon quantitative measures to provide 
‘objective’ analysis of judicial performance. That analysis is largely used to support 
related mechanisms of judicial accountability. In this paper I examine three 
particular usages, namely the use of judicial performance evaluation as a tool of 
judicial professional self-improvement, as an aid to judicial retention elections, and 
as an aid to judicial promotions.6 I conclude by arguing judicial performance 
evaluation has a limited and derivative usage. It must always be evaluated by 
reference to its ability to promote the ends of judicial accountability, with the 
accountability benefits outweighing its – broadly assessed – costs.  
2. The origins of judicial performance evaluation 
To understand the modern concept of judicial performance evaluation it is useful, 
like for all things, to start at the beginning. Like all contested things, however, that 
beginning is difficult to identify. There are several threads that run through the 
modern usage of the term, each with a distinct origin.7 The language of judicial 
performance evaluation, at least, first began to appear in the US in the late 1970s. 
Certainly, the first official state-sponsored ‘judicial performance evaluation’ 
program began in Alaska in 1976 (See Brennan et al. 1986, p. 78-82, Elek et al. 
2012, p. 65)8 as part of an effort provide better information for retention elections 
(Brody 2008, p. 118, Elek, et al. 2012, p. 65). In contrast to the pre-existing and 
problematic programs of ‘Bar Polls’ (See Aynes 1981, p. 268, Pelander 1998, p. 
648, White 2002, p. 1064-1066), the new approach sought to provide more reliable 
and accurate information for voters. The concept of judicial performance evaluation 
was picked up by an internal paper of the National Center on State Courts,9 and the 
ABA10 where the focus shifted away from evaluation for retention purposes towards 
professional development (Aynes 1981, p. 272). Even at this early stage, this 
divergence of rationale affected affected the design of appropriate mechanisms 
                                                 
5 I note that when I use the term ‘theory’ in this paper in the sense of ‘legal theory’, that is, the process 
of providing clear analytic analysis of concepts, institutional functions and role. A do not use the term as 
referring to ‘a theory’ in the positivistic assertion sense of a position demonstrable through empirical 
analysis.  
6 I explore these issues by reference to the articles of Berch and Bass (2014) and Riedel (2014) 
published in this volume, and the work of another participant, Warren (2011). 
7 It is interesting to note that Aynes, writing at the beginning of the emergence of the judicial 
performance evaluation movement already recognised that the ‘impetus for such a program of judicial 
evaluation is difficult to trace’ (Aynes 1981, p. 261). 
8 It is worth noting that the Alaskan approach was followed in 1978 by New Jersey (Aynes 1981, p. 261). 
9 See National Center on State Courts, ‘Judicial Performance Evaluation: Concept Paper’, (Draft 1979). 
10 American Bar Association, ‘Evaluation of Judicial Performance Committee: Concept Paper’, (1979). See 
Aynes (1981, p. 263). 
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(See Aynes 1981, p. 269). By the beginning of the 1980s there was a clear sense 
that use of judicial performance evaluation to improve the quality of judicial work 
was an idea whose time had come.11  
This rapid emergence reflected the seductive power behind the name of this new 
tool. The management tool of job performance evaluation had been gaining traction 
as a tool of management in private industry, the public sector, and education.12 The 
language of ‘performance evaluation’ was the fashion of the moment in 
management, and quickly spread to this new judicial context (Spigelman 2002, p. 
20). In doing so it perhaps unwittingly imported into the judicial context 
management ideas together with management language. This rapidly expanded 
with the emergence of theories of ‘new public management’, which emphasised 
values of efficiency and a private-enterprise mentality (See Ng 2007, p. 11).13 This 
new public management approach transformed and invigorated the use of judicial 
performance evaluation. ‘Evaluation’ transformed from a qualitative to a 
quantitative enterprise, striving to measure ‘objective’ outputs in a way that was 
apparently free from bias and improper subjectivity. This attractive new form 
sought to introduce ‘managerial’ systems of judicial accountability that conceived of 
the judicial system in terms of outputs (Mohr and Contini 2007, p. 10, 19). The 
traditional judicial forms of of legal accountability were overlaid by new methods of 
managerial accountability that strove to ‘protect and promote efficiency, cost 
control, and link results to resources’ (Contini and Mohr 2007, p. 30). This 
movement was attractive to many as it seems self-evident that citizens are entitled 
to know that public funds are being spent efficiently and effectively (Spigelman 
2002, p. 19). This model appeared to present a means of increasing judicial 
accountability, increasing performance, and enhancing efficiency without interfering 
with judicial independence (See White 2002, Colbran 2002b, Brody 2008, Haines 
2010). However, from the beginning the managerialisation of judicial accountability 
met with resistance, as the judge was no longer valued exclusively as an 
independent decision-maker, but also as an actor in a ‘public organisation 
delivering services to the public’ (Contini and Mohr 2007, p. 27-8). This represented 
a revolutionary re-conception of the judicial role (See Spigelman 2000b, p. 380, 
2002, p. 26). Management objectives of productivity were seen to diverge and 
conflict with judicial objectives of impartiality and independence (Contini and Mohr 
2007, p. 26). It became feared that judicial accountability would come to be seen 
‘exclusively from a managerial perspective’ (Contini and Mohr 2007, p. 28), where 
all that mattered would be those things that could be counted and measured 
(Spigelman 2006, p. 69). Management practices gave a name to a new tool of 
judicial accountability, and have come, over time to heavily shape the modern 
practice of judicial performance evaluation. Judicial performance evaluation cannot 
be divorced from the managerialist context. There are clear originating forces 
located in ideas of judicial self-improvement and public democratic engagement, 
though these do not tell the whole story. The movement towards measurable and 
quantifiable indicators of judicial standards arose in the context of arguments about 
economic efficiency. This association continues to create hostility towards the tool. 
To avoid such hostility it is necessary to clearly articulate the motivation and 
purposes for which the tool of judicial performance evaluation will be used. 
                                                 
11 Aynes suggests the idea ‘probably came to many people across the country almost simultaneously’ 
(Aynes 1981, p. 261). 
12 Aynes describes this model as operating ‘on a very basic premise of improving human behavior: that 
desirable conduct should receive positive reinforcement and that areas for improvement should be 
identified so that the individual in question can improve performance’ (Aynes 1981, p. 262). 
13 Spigelman (2002, p. 19) has described the dominant characteristic of the new managerialist focus as 
‘a wish to replicate a results-driven model, said to be characteristic of the private sector where the free 
operation of market forces ensures efficient use of resources. This approach is said to require the explicit 
identification of goals, which must be measurable so that performance can be assessed in what is 
regarded as an “objective” manner’. 
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2.1. Different justifications and purposes 
Given the history from which judicial performance evaluation arose, it is 
unsurprisingly difficult to articulate the purpose of the tool. Each of the different 
originating influences – ideas of selection and retention of judges, of professional 
improvement, and of measurable efficiency – have left indelible marks on the 
modern form of judicial performance evaluation.  
While there seems to be broad recognition that judicial performance evaluation 
programs help courts achieve a variety of goals, articulating these goals are is not 
always easy. In the US the emphasis has often been on informing voters in 
retention elections,14 though other goals such as including improving judicial quality 
and aiding transparency have also been identified (Elek et al. 2012, p. 65). Kourlis 
and Singer (2008, p. 8-9) argue that such programs serve three objectives:  
1) ‘to provide constructive feedback to sitting judges to inform their 
professional development;  
2) to educate the public on the work of its judges and foster appropriate 
expectations about the role of the judge; and  
3) where applicable, to provide relevant information to decision-makers 
concerning the retention or reappointment of judges.’15 
The educative purpose introduces a new strand into the discourse, recognising that 
the mere use of a tool such as judicial performance evaluation will create ripples in 
society: it may educate the public, or it may serve as a reminder to the judiciary 
that the public are entitled to superior performance from the judiciary (Colbran 
2003b, p. 68). These ripples may be desirable, but there can be unintended 
consequences. Some of these consequences have played a strong role in shaping 
the use of judicial performance evaluation programs in Europe (See Contini and 
Mohr 2007, p. 36, 39). The career judiciaries of the continental civil legal systems 
provide a different set of demands on the administration of justice, and in this 
context the management and managerialist aspects of judicial performance 
evaluation have come to the fore. The evaluation of judges is seen as a key ‘tool of 
staff management’ (Riedel 2014, p. 977), though often it has also been seen as a 
tool of economic efficiency (Contini and Mohr 2007, p. 37). In Australia, programs 
of judicial performance evaluation have been more limited, with the focus mostly on 
court and administrative performance measurement16 as part of a strategic 
approach to judicial institutional management (Mohr et al. 1996, p. 157). In more 
recent years the systematised tools of performance evaluation have, however, been 
also utilised for judicial professional development (See Warren 2011). 
The different purposes for which judicial performance evaluation has been utilised 
throughout the world make it difficult isolate a common theme unifying these 
practices. While there is the real possibility that it is an illusion to talk of a global 
practice of ‘judicial performance evaluation’ – that there is only a collection of 
unrelated practices that coincidentally share the same name – there does seem to 
be a common underlying objective that unifies these different usages. These 
different programs all seek to utilise structured, tightly-regulated and repeatable 
methodologies to measure judicial performance. By the use of standardised 
interview and questionnaires, analysis of outputs and performance indicators, and 
similar techniques, programs of judicial performance evaluation strive to provide 
                                                 
14 Griffin, for example, argues that beneath the various schemes there is constant underlying premise 
that such programs operate to ‘enhance ‘voter awareness’ and popular participation in judicial elections’ 
(Griffin 1995, p. 5). Brody has expanded on this electoral purpose, arguing that informed voting 
operates to ‘thereby ensure a high-quality judiciary’ (Brody 2000, p. 334) though does not articulate the 
precise mechanism by which this may occur.  
15 It is worth noting that the third of these objectives is phrased in such a way as to capture 
reappointment mechanisms other than retention elections.  
16 This has been described as a focus on the ‘time and motion’ of judicial activity (Colbran 2002b, p. 
236). 
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feedback on a judge’s performance in a way that does not depend upon mere 
opinion of a few (often partial) individuals.17 The use of that feedback is directed, 
through a number of different paths, towards a common purpose: the promotion of 
judicial accountability. To understand the modern practice of judicial performance 
evaluation (and its limitations) it is necessary to understand its relationship to the 
concept of judicial accountability. 
3. The concept of judicial accountability 
While society places ‘enormous trust and confidence’ (Gleeson 1979, p. 338)18 in 
the judiciary, trust alone is insufficient. We insist upon mechanisms of ‘judicial 
accountability’ to promote the integrity, excellence and responsiveness of the 
judiciary. The basic imperative for accountability may be irresistible:19 ‘judicial 
accountability’ appears to be a ‘self-evident good’ (Handsley 2001b, p. 181), 
something that ‘everyone is ‘for’, like democracy or freedom’ (Spigelman 2002, p. 
18). However, the realisation of this imperative is problematic; the scope of the 
concept is unclear and the literature lacks theoretical clarity. This conceptual 
imprecision leaves the concept liable to be co-oped and misused (Geyh 2008, p. 
912), allowing the ‘drumbeat of judicial accountability’ to drown out other judicial 
values.20 As Sandra Day O’Connor (2008, p. 1) notes: 
‘Judicial accountability...is a concept that is frequently misunderstood at best and 
abused at worst. It has become a rallying cry for those who want in reality to 
dictate substantive judicial outcomes.’ 
This concern is particularly acute in the context of judicial performance evaluation, 
with fear that such programs present an opportunity for those who wish to 
improperly influence judicial conduct to clothe their actions in the legitimising 
pursuit of ‘accountability.’ This concern is exacerbated because the uncertainty of 
the proper nature of judicial accountability and its relationship to judicial 
performance evaluation.  
3.1. The nature of judicial accountability  
The term ‘accountability’ is itself an ‘amorphous’ (Le Sueur 2004, p. 73) and beset 
with ambiguities: for example, it has some close (Handsley 2001b, p. 180),21 but 
ultimately unclear relationship to the concept of responsibility (See Handsley 
2001a, p. 68, Pimentel 2009, p. 14). In the judicial context, the term has evolved 
away from any simple ‘command-and-control’ conception, where a third-party has a 
power of direction (Le Sueur 2004, p. 73). Judicial accountability is not about 
ceding judicial authority to anyone. A judge may be required to ‘give account’ (a 
professional ‘explanatory’ usage) for conduct, but not to derogate responsibility to 
act. What then is the purpose of judicial accountability? It is not sufficient to 
examine only the old question ‘accountability to whom and for what’ (Spigelman 
2002, p. 18, see also White 2002, p. 1060-1061). Rather, it is critical we ask: to 
what end we wish to hold judges to account? 
Judicial accountability must exist for the limited purpose of ensuring that the judge 
strives for the excellent performance of the judicial function: to ensure that judges 
‘do the job they are supposed to do in the way they are supposed to do it’ 
(Handsley 2001b, p. 218). The mechanisms of judicial accountability operate to 
                                                 
17 Anderson characterises judicial retention evaluation programs as having some common elements: 
official status; broad-based survey mechanisms; wide dissemination of survey results and 
recommendations (Anderson 2001, p. 1376). 
18 As Jayawickrama (2002, p. 1091) notes, judicial power is ‘power is given on trust’. 
19 As O’Connor notes, judicial accountability is seen as ‘a fundamental democratic requirement’ 
(O’Connor 2008, p. 1). 
20 Drummond (2001a, p. 304-305) notes that this has had the effect of making any challenge to 
accountability appear heretical. 
21 For example, White (2002, p. 1060) argues that accountability simply ‘means answerability or 
responsibility.’ See also Kirby 2003, p. 42.  
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promote the optimal performance of the judicial function, motivating the judge to 
adhere to the judicial decision-making method, maintain impartiality, avoid the 
abuse of office, and strive for excellence. Judicial accountability is a limited 
functional/instrumental concept (Bandes 2006, p. 947, Geyh 2008, p. 916) that 
promotes the attainment of judicial excellence.  
This conception demands, of course, that we articulate what judicial ‘excellence’ 
(Gething 2008a, p. 243). One approach is to simply list the characteristics or traits 
of the ‘ideal’ judge.22 There are many notable enunciations of such values,23 yet 
there is very little sustained analysis of why these particular values matter. An 
instrumentalist conception of judicial accountability challenges us to look beyond 
discrete values, to articulate why the pursuit of such values furthers the ends of 
judicial accountability. This requires an understanding of the nature and purpose of 
the judicial function.  
3.2. The judicial function and integrity  
It is beyond the scope of this article to provide an extensive examination of the 
nature of the judicial function.24 It suffices to note that the judicial function has two 
core aspects: dispute-resolution and social (normative) governance. Judicial 
decisions are not only a particular type of institutionalised third-party merit-based 
resolution, but are acts of normative governance - each judicial decision has an 
impact upon the legal norms it applies. The effects of each decision radiate from 
beyond the particular dispute, vitalising, clarifying and developing the law. This dual 
role, dispute resolution and social governance, demand the pursuit of different 
values by the judge. Dispute-resolution demands finality and a focus upon the 
individual litigants; Governance demands the pursuit of responsive correctness, 
focusing on broader social interests and the generalised maintenance of legal 
norms.  
Both roles demand, though, a reputation for judicial integrity – such a reputation 
provides the institutional legitimacy upon which the judicial function depends. If 
this reputation for integrity falters, the ability of a judge to perform the judicial 
function collapses. A judge who acts with blatant partiality or arbitrariness will be 
ineffective at finally disposing of the dispute: disputants are unlikely to consider 
themselves bound by a decision that fundamentally abandons the judicial paradigm. 
Moreover, where there is a general loss of faith in judicial integrity the use of state 
enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance will become socially 
unacceptable.25 Similarly, such an institution without a reputation for integrity 
cannot perform its social governance role. Judicial governance is legitimised 
through a discursive process, gaining its normative strength through its 
persuasiveness, broad acceptance, and ability to promote responsive stability. This 
demands judges maintain a reputation for fairness, integrity, courageous 
impartiality, wisdom and excellence; in turn this grants the judicial institution a 
necessary legitimacy. However, where that reputation fails and the institution is 
regarded as arbitrary, capricious or unduly aloof, it no longer becomes rational for 
the individual to be guided by judicial statements as they lack any expectation of 
consistency. Without integrity, and the reputation for it, the judiciary cannot 
perform its dispute-resolution task and is incapable of performing its governance 
function. 
                                                 
22 One illustrative example is provided by Goodman (1982, p. 113-114) who argues that the ideal type 
of a good judge would display: (1) Neutrality to the parties; (2) Fair mindedness; (3) Being well versed 
in the law; (4) Ability to write lucidly and logically; (5) Personal integrity; (6) Good physical and mental 
health; (7) Judicial temperament; and (8) Ability to handle judicial power sensibly.  
23 Similar lists are produced by the ABA (2007); or the appointment criteria of the UK Judicial 
Appointment Commision (s.d.). 
24 For an extensive discussion of this topic, and its impact upon issues of judicial theory and practice, see 
McIntyre (2013). 
25 While an institution sustained by state force may be able to exercise a degree of social control, such a 
‘might-based’ institution abandons any pretension of ‘judicial’ resolution. 
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To ensure the excellent performance of the judicial function, judicial institutions 
require mechanisms to ensure the constraints of the judicial method and the 
standards of impartiality are adhered to. The mechanisms of judicial accountability 
serve this purpose, promoting both the authentic actuality of judicial integrity, and 
the reputation and appearance of it. In doing so it creates the institutional 
legitimacy necessary for the judicial function. Conceiving of judicial accountability in 
this way reveals both the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ aspects of accountability. 
3.3. The ‘external objective’ and ‘internal subjective’ aspects of accountability  
Judicial accountability takes on a two-fold nature, promoting the judicial function by 
maintaining both the actuality of, and reputation for, integrity. These ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ elements of accountability respond to different aspects of that concept, 
and justify different mechanisms.26 The internal ‘subjective’ or ‘personal’ aspect of 
judicial accountability is directed towards the individual judge, developing a 
personal and professional imperative to actually ‘do the right thing’. This personal 
accountability comes from the judge’s own internal moral compass and personal 
integrity, not from any ‘vulnerability to discipline or other retribution for misdeeds’ 
(Pimentel 2009, p. 16). It rests upon an internalised judicial desire to actually 
adhere to judicial method and pursue excellence because it is the right thing to do. 
In contrast, the external ‘objective’ or ‘structural’ aspect of judicial accountability is 
directed to the creation and maintenance of an institutional reputation for integrity. 
This distinct element complements the actual integrity of personal accountability, 
ensuring that judges both act with integrity and appear to do so.27 The institutional 
reputation for integrity, quality and impartiality is critical to found the social 
legitimacy upon which both the dispute-resolution and social governance aspects of 
the judicial function depends.28 Mechanisms of judicial accountability may promote 
the excellent performance of the judicial function by furthering either or both of the 
internal and external aspects of accountability.29  
3.4. A limited conception of judicial accountability 
The instrumental nature of this conception of judicial accountability means that 
while every mechanism may directly promote either internal or external aspects of 
judicial accountability, it must ultimately be assessed by reference to its impact on 
the performance of the judicial function.30 Judicial accountability cannot operate for 
its own ends: a non-instrumental conception of judicial accountability would distort 
judicial decision-making and undermine the very impartiality, integrity and 
confidence it should promote.31 Judicial accountability possesses an inherently 
limited and constrained nature: every judicial accountability mechanism must 
operate in a ‘way that does not damage, or undermine, the essential characteristics 
of the judiciary’ (Kirby 2003, p. 44). This requires a critical analysis of the benefits 
of the use of the mechanism against the ‘costs’ involved in the operation of 
                                                 
26 In using this division I build upon and expand the division of Pimentel (2009, p. 16-17). 
27 This need for institutional legitimacy reflect that oft cited aphorism that ‘justice should not only be 
done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done’: R v Sussex Justices [1924] 1 KB 256, 
p. 259 (Lord Hewart). For discussion see Spigelman (2000a, p. 290-292). 
28 As Jayawickrama (2002, p. 563) observes, ‘the real source of judicial power is the public acceptance 
of the moral authority and integrity of the judiciary.’ Similarly Brody notes that a ‘trusted judiciary will 
be respected and viewed as legitimate. A judiciary that is not trusted may have its legitimacy, authority, 
and eventually orders questioned by the citizenry or by the other branches of government’ (Brody 2008, 
p. 125). 
29 Mohr and Contini (2007, p. 11) argue that accountability can be characterised on the one hand as 
those systems which instil the appropriate values and interests in an organisation, and, on the other 
hand, as the mechanisms by which one can assess whether those values and interests are built into that 
organisations actions. This division creates a fracture between the two conceptions. In contrast, the 
bifurcation of the two aspects I describe reflects two sides of a common pursuit.  
30 Contini and Mohr (2007, p. 30) note that too often in public debates accountability has become an 
iconic end in itself, with sight lost of its instrumental nature. 
31 For example, a maladjusted accountability mechanisms may create feedback loops that improperly 
influence the judge to decide in a ‘safe’ manner (See Handsley 2001b, p. 182). 
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accountability mechanisms, including the impact on competing values, time, and 
financial considerations.32  
4. Judicial performance as a tool of judicial accountability 
This instrumentalist conception of judicial accountability profoundly affects the 
analysis of judicial performance evaluation programs: it requires that we carefully 
articulate how evaluation programs promote the ends of accountability. 
Performance evaluation must further the pursuit of the internal and external 
aspects of accountability, and must do so in a way that is of net benefit to the 
excellent performance of the judicial function. 
Judicial performance evaluation programs utilise structured, tightly-regulated and 
repeatable methodologies to measure judicial performance, providing feedback on a 
judge’s performance. That feedback can then be utilised to augment other 
mechanisms of judicial accountability. The provision of feedback does not of itself 
directly promote the objectives of accountability.33 It is because of the 
consequences that that may follow from a measurement that such measurement 
may promote the ends of accountability. It is not the measurement of judicial 
performance that promotes these ends, but the use of that information. Internal 
accountability arises from the act of judicial self-improvement driven by reflection 
on feedback, and not merely from the measuring of conduct. Public confidence in 
judicial competence will only be affected where members of the public utilise that 
information, considering it to form some new and concrete conclusion. 
No matter how accurate or extensive a measurement is, it does not have 
instrumental consequences until it is used in some way. Feedback matters because 
it can inform subsequent choices and actions which then affect change. Whether 
the feedback of evaluation is utilised for personnel/management purposes 
(resulting in promotion, demotions, or even firings) or for developmental purposes 
(aiding self-improvement) (Felter 2008, p. 158), it is this subsequent use that 
ultimately matters. Judicial performance evaluation does not operate as a direct 
mechanism of judicial accountability, as it does not directly affect either aspect of 
accountability. Instead, performance evaluation acts as a tool to provide 
information to aid the operation of other accountability mechanisms. Judicial 
performance evaluation indirectly promotes the purposes of judicial accountability 
by aiding the operation of related primary mechanisms of accountability. The tool of 
judicial performance evaluation can operate to further the efficacy of a number of 
accountability mechanisms, including: (1) aiding judicial promotion in professional 
judiciary; (2) informing judicial retention elections; and (3) aiding professional 
development and self-improvement. 
Ultimately, though, the accountability gain will always be constrained by the 
limitations inherent in the primary mechanism itself. No matter how well designed 
or implemented a judicial performance evaluation program is, its role in promoting 
                                                 
32 Indeed care must be taken to ensure that overactive accountability mechanisms do not inadvertently 
undermine the objectives they should be promoting by too regularly demonstrating that an institution is 
‘accountable’. As O’Neil argued in her Rieth Lectures, public institutions, like plants that ‘don’t flourish 
when we pull them up too often to check how their roots are growing’; they cannot thrive ‘if we 
constantly uproot them to demonstrate that everything is transparent and trustworthy’ (O’Neil 2002, p. 
6). 
33 While I acknowledge the possibility that the mere of measuring performance may directly as a means 
of accountability, I argue that in most cases there is an anterior process of reflection or critique that 
ultimately operates to further the ends of accountability. There may appear to be some gain to both the 
internal and external aspects of accountability merely by measuring judicial performance, and making it 
be publically known that such measurement is occurring. Programs of judicial performance evaluation 
may appear to directly promote a public appreciation of the integrity and competence of the judiciary, by 
showing a judicial openness to critique and demonstrating to the public the competence of the judiciary. 
Moreover, they appear to promote the internal aspects of actual adherence to integrity and judicial 
decision-making method by promoting judicial self-reflection. However, it is not the act of measurement 
itself that is achieving these ends, but the subsequent use of that material. 
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the ends of judicial accountability will always be dependent upon the use to which it 
is put. Performance evaluation can make mechanisms of accountability more 
effective, but it cannot ever rise above the limitations of that mechanism. An 
instrumentalist conception of judicial accountability demands that judicial 
performance evaluation be viewed as a derivative tool, operating for accountability 
purposes but through other mechanisms of accountability.  
The derivative instrumental nature of judicial performance evaluation imposes a 
second profound limitation upon the operation of evaluation programs: the values 
measured must be rationally connected to the excellent performance of the judicial 
function. Judges must be evaluated by reference to criteria linked to that such 
performance. If independence, integrity, and competence are the ‘hallmarks’ of an 
excellent judiciary then they must be ‘the principles for which a judiciary should be 
held accountable’ (O’Connor 2008, p. 4).  
It may be that these values are not capable of direct measurement or indeed of 
measurement at all. Certainly, Spigelman (2006, p. 72) argues that the core 
judicial values such as justice, accessibility, openness, fairness, impartiality, 
legitimacy, participation, honesty, and rationality ‘are not capable of measurement, 
not even by proxy indicators.’ He argues that such values cannot be measured, 
only judged (Spigelman 2002, p. 25). While this conclusion may be debatable, 
Spigelman highlights a real concern. It does not follow however, that judicial 
performance evaluation cannot act as a tool to help motivate judges to strive for 
these values by providing feedback. These arguments do, though, highlight two 
points: Firstly, evaluation programs must not only measure what is easily 
measurable, but must create space to ‘assess what is important’ (Mohr et al. 1996, 
p. 158);34 Secondly, the foundation of any strong judicial performance evaluation 
program will ultimately rest upon on the quality of the metrics used (Elek et al. 
2012, p. 72), and the connection of those metrics to the underlying objectives of 
judicial accountability. Measurement is no neutral thing. Poorly designed 
measurement criteria can operate to introduce distortive influences into judicial 
systems (See Spigelman 2002, p. 25-26; Mohr and Contini 2007, p. 35).  
The instrumentalist conception of judicial accountability introduces profound 
restrictions to the operation of judicial performance evaluation programs. However, 
within those limits it creates a genuine space for such programs to flourish.  
5. Examining the implications of the conception  
This conceptual framework for the analysis of judicial performance evaluation 
programs invites us to re-examine existing programs to reflect upon how they 
respond to these imperatives and limitations. In the previous section I identified 
three ways in which performance evaluation can promote judicial accountability, 
namely: 
1) Aiding judicial promotion in professional judiciaries; 
2) Informing judicial retention elections; and 
3) Aiding professional development and self-improvement. 
In this section I will examine these different uses by reference to three case-studies 
presented at, or related to, the Onãti workshop from which this volume emerges. 
Reflecting on these diverse programs helps demonstrate the benefit of thinking 
seriously about the nature and scope of judicial performance evaluation.  
                                                 
34 This issue of ‘measurement bias’ has been described by Drummond in the following terms: ‘if 
something is difficult to measure, it is often treated as unimportant; if it is impossible to measure it is 
often treated as if it did not exist’ (Drummond 2001b, p. 377). 
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5.1. Performance evaluation and judicial promotions 
Firstly, performance evaluation can be a powerful tool to aid the accountability 
mechanism that is judicial promotion. This role is particularly important for the 
career judiciaries of the continental judicial systems, where there is a clear 
imperative for a system to select judges to populate the higher ranks of the 
judiciary. Appointment on the basis of purely arbitrary or nepotistic grounds is 
unacceptable. Given the normative impact of higher courts decisions, it is clearly 
preferable to populate the higher judiciary with the best judges.  
In a career judiciary, this generally means that appointment to the higher judiciary 
becomes a matter of promotion from the lower judiciary as it is rational to assume 
that a candidate who has an excellent judicial track record will make a good higher 
level judge: past performance is a good indicia of future performance in the new 
role.35 Moreover, a system of merit-based promotion not only helps to ensure the 
quality of the higher judiciary, but critically also serves as an effective mechanism 
of accountability for judges of all courts: if judges are promoted on their record of 
judicial excellence (performance of the judicial function) and judges have a desire 
to be promoted, then judges will be more motivated to attain excellence. The 
rewarding of excellence promotes the attainment of excellence. In addition, merit-
based promotion mechanisms enhance the perception of judicial excellence, giving 
the public good reason to have confidence in the ability of the judiciary.  
Of course, to relate promotion to the competence of the judge unavoidably requires 
processes to ‘evaluate’ the performance of the judge. In Europe judicial 
performance evaluation has traditionally been seen exclusively as a tool of ‘staff 
management’ (Riedel 2014, p. 977), directed to the selection and promotion of 
individual judges (Contini et al. 2014, p. 1102). In his article in this volume, 
Johannes Riedel, the President of the Cologne Court of Appeal, outlines with great 
detail and valuable insight the process by which judges are evaluated in this way in 
Germany. Riedel notes that higher judicial appointments are largely based on the 
results of performance evaluations (Riedel 2014, p. 983).36 The systematic 
assessment provided by the programs of judicial performance evaluation provides 
the crucial tool that enables the merit-based promotion of judges.  
5.1.1. Performance evaluation and the problem of proxies 
Of course, if evaluation is to aid merit-based promotion in furthering the objectives 
of accountability, that evaluation must assess judicial excellence. If the evaluation 
criteria are unrelated to the core judicial function then the nexus between 
evaluation and the objectives of the judicial accountability break down. If a judge is 
purely evaluated, for example, on the number of cases disposed of, the judge 
becomes motivated merely to dispose of more cases (See Spigelman 2000b, p. 
381, 2006, p. 75). To further the ends of accountability, the focus of assessment 
criteria must be on underlying values of judicial excellence.37 To promote both the 
internal and external aspects of accountability, the judge must be assessed on 
being a good judge.  
Of course, it is much easier to list the characteristics of a ‘good’ judge (Riedel 2014, 
p. 977-978) than to use systematic evaluation to ‘objectively’ assess them (See 
Spigelman 2002, p. 25). To some extent, evaluating judicial performance means 
                                                 
35 Note that this assumption has its limits, and depends upon a sufficient degree of similarity between 
the roles. It may be, for example, that a given judge is an excellent trial judge, but is poorly suited to 
the abstractions involved in upper appellate level judicial decision-making. Nevertheless, as a general 
principle it seems unobjectionable that excellence a lower level is a useful indicator of competence at 
appellate level.  
36 Critically, Riedel concludes that as a criterion of promotion it is ‘quite clear that final marks reached in 
the evaluations play a decisive role in the decision’ (Riedel 2014, p. 984). 
37 Evaluation does not further the ends of accountability when sight is lost of the goals for which 
evaluation should be utilised, where ‘attention shifts to the minutiae of the data and away from the 
purpose for which it was required in the first place’ (Contini and Mohr 2007, p. 35). 
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judging judicial decisions. As Riedel (2014, p. 977, 982) notes, this presents the 
‘unique [difficulty] in evaluating individual judges’:  
‘It is quite clear that judicial independence as guaranteed by the constitution 
forbids any kind of evaluation which weighs, marks and values the correctness and 
quality of judicial decisions.’  
As a result, German evaluations have been restricted to general observation, 
assessing a judge for ‘personal or professional conduct but never for the way he 
[sic] has applied the law in his [his] decisions’ (Riedel 2014, p. 982). German 
judicial performance evaluation does not assess the performance of the essential 
judicial task, instead relying upon a series of proxies to provide a substitute 
assessment (Riedel 2014, p. 982). Arguably, the conclusion that judicial 
independence prohibits this form of external evaluation of judicial decisions rests 
upon a debatable conception of judicial independence that misconstrues the 
functional nature of independence (See Seibert-Fohr 2010). Nevertheless, putting 
to one side the normative necessity of this restriction, it is certainly the case that 
the German judiciary sees this as an unavoidable and meaningful restriction.  
The risks inherent in this approach are, however, significant. Most troublingly, the 
use of performance proxies risks sundering the connection between performance 
evaluation and the accountability objectives of merit-based promotion. To further 
those objectives, promotion mechanisms must motivate the judge to perform the 
core judicial function with excellence and integrity. The use of proxies that exclude 
consideration of the judge’s substantive decision-making pose a three-fold risk. 
Firstly, the link between judicial merit (in the sense of the excellent performance of 
the judicial function) and judicial promotion ceases to be the defining feature of 
evaluation. ‘Merit’ becomes assessed by reference to the proxy values. The ‘best’ 
judge for promotion purposes is the judge that ‘best’ reflects those proxies in his or 
her judicial conduct. To the extent that ‘merit’-promotion affects judicial behaviour, 
this method of evaluation risks motivating judges to pursue these proxies rather 
the direct pursuit of excellence, thereby undermining the very mechanism of 
accountability it exists to support. While the chosen proxies will ideally approximate 
or indicate good performance, such a relationship is contingent and vulnerable. The 
good judge may decide cases without undue delay, but that does not mean that 
judicial excellence can be equated with a high case-disposal rate. Such proxies risk 
judges altering their conduct to increase chances for promotion. Any argument that 
judges of integrity would resist such a temptation only illustrates the point: the use 
of proxies creates a temptation that can distort judicial performance. Secondly, and 
related to this point, there is the risk that by substituting an external motivation 
value (promotion) for the underlying integrity and internalised self-motivation of 
judge that such mechanisms can undermine the integrity of the judge. The pursuit 
of promotion risks being seen as ‘greedy’ and ‘self-serving’, thereby undermining 
the personal integrity and duty-driven attainment of excellence that are the 
hallmarks of true professionalism. Finally, the use of proxies undermines the 
external confidence benefits of merit-based promotion. Where merit is assessed by 
direct reference to the excellent performance of the judicial function, merit-based 
promotion gives the public good reason to be confident in the ability, competence 
and integrity of the judiciary. The use of proxies greatly weakens this connection, 
for the same reason that it undermines the actual attainment of excellence. 
For these reasons, the use of proxies risks distorting and fracturing the connection 
between merit-based promotion and the underlying purposes of judicial 
accountability. By indirectly measuring performance in this way, performance 
evaluation risks undermining the mechanisms it is designed to serve. One response 
to this threat is to abandon merit-based promotion. Practices of promotion on the 
basis of seniority have chosen this route, though it is beset with its own difficulties. 
Alternatively, we may choose to abandon the tool of performance evaluation on the 
basis that the distortive risks of gamesmanship outweigh any accountability 
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gains.38 Alternatively, it may be that substantive judicial performance constitutes 
an informal factor that influences merit-based promotion. There may be an element 
of cognitive dissonance, whereby judicial performance influences evaluation despite 
explicit commitments to the contrary. Fourthly, we may recognise the real potential 
of these threats to undermine the objectives of accountability, yet nevertheless 
decide that the benefits of structured evaluation outweigh these threats. This 
approach represents an uneasy compromise, and is only sustainable if honest, 
informed and regular reflection on the entirety of the program is undertaken. 
Finally, and perhaps preferably, we can lessen the role of evaluation feedback in 
merit-based promotion to allow space for genuine reflection and appraisal of the 
quality and competence of the judges’ judicial performances. Performance 
evaluation would inform promotion decisions, but would not be determinative in the 
way Riedel describes. This approach directly challenges the proposition that any 
reflection on substantive performance undermines judicial independence. However, 
if the quality and competence of a judgment can be assessed independently of its 
substantive outcome (substantive correctness), then such evaluation would not 
interfere with judicial independence.39 This approach is arguably more intellectually 
honest than the other options above, though all of these approaches have their 
difficulties.  
Judicial performance evaluation can be a useful aid the operation of merit-based 
promotion mechanisms of judicial accountability, informing promotion choices and 
motivating judges to attain excellence in their judicial role. However, such 
programs can also distort the operation of promotion mechanisms, undermining 
accountability and the attainment of excellence. This risk requires reassessment of 
both the theory and practice behind the use of evaluation programs. 
5.2. Performance evaluation informing judicial retention elections 
Secondly, judicial performance evaluation programs have, since their genesis, been 
used to enhance the operation of judicial retention elections. The practice of 
subjecting judges to elections for appointment or retention is an almost exclusively 
US practice. Some ninety per cent of America's state judges must stand for 
election, either to gain or retain office (Brandenburg 2009, p. 372). Judicial 
performance evaluation is utilised in those states which augment merit selection of 
judges with subsequent retention elections.40 The rationale underlying retention 
elections as a mechanism of judicial accountability is that as judges’ re-election will 
depend upon judicial performance (See Tarr 2009, p. 610), then judges will be 
motivated to perform the judicial role with excellence. If retention elections actually 
made judges’ tenure dependent upon excellent judicial performance, then they 
would provide a powerful motivation for judges to act with integrity and excellence 
and would promote the external confidence objectives of judicial accountability. 
Retention elections can operate as effective tools of judicial accountability. 
5.2.1. Performance evaluation and the provision of information to voters 
However, if judges are to be assessed by voters on their judicial performance, it is 
necessary for the electorate to have access to relevant information about that 
performance. Judicial performance evaluation programs can fill the ‘information 
vacuum’ created by retention elections to lend credibility and meaning to those 
elections (Pelander 1998, p. 647). These programs strive to comprehensively 
                                                 
38 This is the response of Colbran when he states: ‘There is no viable link between judicial performance 
evaluation and judicial promotion... The potential for increased productivity is more than outweighed by 
the intrusion on judicial independence, and the risk of gamesmanship distorting the function of the 
judiciary in dispensing justice’ (Colbran 2001, p. 357). 
39 I recognise that this approach depends upon a particular conception of the nature of judicial 
independence, and upon a particular analytic jurisprudential approach to the concept of law and of 
judicial decision-making that are not without controversy. It is beyond the scope of this paper to engage 
in such weighty debates.  
40 As Pelander (1998, p. 647) notes, retention elections are ‘an integral aspect of merit selection’. 
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evaluate each judge’s performance, and distribute that information to the voting 
public (Berch and Bass 2014, p. 932-933). By informing the public about the 
performance of sitting judges (Brody 2000, p. 341), judicial performance evaluation 
is seen to add a ‘powerful layer’ of to the operation of retention elections as a 
mechanism of judicial accountability (Berch and Bass 2014, p. 932-933).41 The 
feedback provided by such programs becomes the ‘missing ingredient’ necessary 
for ‘judicial elections to appropriately and effectively facilitate judicial accountability’ 
(Brody 2008, p. 129). Judicial performance evaluation provides the ‘objective, 
survey-based information on the performance of judges’ (Anderson 2001, p. 1375) 
that is necessary for the accountability mechanism of retention elections to serve 
its purpose. The assumption is that a judge with good evaluations will have a far 
better chance of being retained.42 Official judicial performance evaluations 
programs, operating for the express purpose of enabling voters to cast intelligent, 
meaningful votes in retention elections, have now become reasonably common.43 
Such programs generally employ five evaluative criteria: knowledge of the law; 
integrity and freedom from bias; clarity of communication; judicial demeanour; and 
administrative capacity (Kourlis and Singer 2009, p. 657). These programs are 
generally centered on responses to standardized, scaled surveys provided by 
individuals who have had direct dealings with the judge.44 Such programs are seen 
as an effective way of reconciling the demands of independence and accountability 
in the US context (See White 2002, 2009, Kourlis and Singer 2007, Brody 2008). 
In her article in this volume Chief Justice Rebecca White Berch of the Arizona 
Supreme Court provides an overview of the scope and operation of the Arizona 
system of ‘judicial performance review’ (Berch and Bass 2014, p. 930; See also 
Pelander 1998, p. 672). After outlining the history and processes of the program 
(Berch and Bass 2014, p. 931-936), she usefully examines both its successes and 
weakness. Interestingly, she argues that possibly the greatest success of the 
program is its impact upon self-evaluation and improvement aspects (Berch and 
Bass 2014, p. 936-937), which was not the original rationale behind the program. 
Secondly, Berch sees as a major success the evidence that the Commission’s 
information regarding Arizona’s judicial performance evaluation program is reaching 
voters.45 The performance evaluation program does seem to provide more 
information to voters, and voters seem to be willing to look for that information.  
5.2.2. Criticism of evaluation programs 
Berch notes, however, issues of concern in the operation of Arizona’s judicial 
performance evaluation program. These concerns reflect common criticisms of 
corresponding evaluation programs. These criticisms fall into three broad 
categories: (1) concern over the ‘accuracy’ of any evaluation; (2) concern over the 
use of that information by voters; and (3) concern over the potential of the 
evaluation program to distort judicial behaviour. I will briefly address each of these 
concerns. 
1. Inaccurate assessments 
Firstly, there is a concern that the assessments provided by the evaluation 
programs do not accurately reflect the judicial performance and competence of the 
judges. One concern is that such assessments systemically ‘over-rate’ judicial 
                                                 
41 As Brody notes, while ‘judicial elections provide the vehicle to provide judicial accountability to the 
public and to provide true accountability that will increase independence, voters need to be given 
sufficient information with which to make electoral decisions’ (Brody 2008, p. 126). 
42 As Tinkhamt notes, a judge ‘with good evaluations is unlikely to be opposed in the next election, while 
one with poor evaluations is more likely to be opposed’ (Tinkhamt 2011, p. 1649). 
43 As of 2008, eight states provide their citizens with information obtained from judicial performance 
evaluation programs for retention election purposes (Brody 2008, p. 118). 
44 For discussion of process generally, see Brody (2008, p. 119). 
45 For example, the ‘hits’ on the Commission’s website, where the information on performance evaluation 
is held, went from a long term average of 100/day to an average 16500 hits a day in weeks leading up 
to the election (Berch and Bass 2014, p. 938). 
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performance.46 Whether or not this concern is misplaced (See Berch and Bass 
2014, p. 939), it does highlight the inevitable subjective aspect to all evaluation. 
Contrary to the commonly perpetuated ‘myth’, evaluation programs unavoidably 
contain significant discretionary elements that can distort the accuracy of any 
findings.47 This issue of accuracy is evident in the second area of concern, namely 
the failure of attorneys to provide full and honest evaluation in judicial surveys 
(Berch and Bass 2014, p. 940). The concern is that attorneys will ‘under-rate’ 
judges they ‘deem bad for business’ (Berch and Bass 2014, p. 940).48 The potential 
of practitioner surveys to provide, as a result of respondent self-interest, a 
distorted assessment of judicial performance was precisely the criticism levelled 
against traditional ‘Bar Polls’. This threat has not been eliminated in the context of 
state regulated performance evaluation programs. Thirdly, there is concern that 
evaluation programs may be systematically biased against particular groups of 
judges. Empirical research does suggest that women and members of minority 
groups receive more negative evaluations than their white male counterparts (Elek 
et al. 2012, Gill 2012). Such findings of systemic bias not only undercut the 
accuracy of evaluation findings, but highlights that the foundation of any strong 
performance evaluation program rests most heavily on the quality of the metrics 
used (Elek et al. 2012, p. 66). These metrics must be intimately connected with the 
characteristics desired in the judge. That connection is not always present. 
Common to all these concerns is the recognition that performance evaluation is 
only useful for promoting the accountability objectives of retention elections so long 
as it provides an accurate assessment of judicial performance. Such programs can 
only promote accountability where they provide information of a sufficient quality 
and accuracy. This is not always the case.  
2. Limited use of information  
The second group of criticisms concerns the use, by voters, of the information 
provided through evaluation programs. Retention elections will only be effective 
mechanisms of accountability where engaged and informed voters are willing to 
meaningfully reflect upon the performance of judges and vote according to judicial 
competence. There is evidence that this is not the case, irrespective of the quality 
of performance information provided. Firstly, there is strong evidence that there 
remains significant ‘under-vote’ with respect to retention elections. Berch and Bass 
note an average ‘under-vote’ of 42.9% – voters who submitted a ballot but did not 
cast a vote for a particular judge (Berch and Bass 2013, p. 940). This issue appears 
to be a recurrent theme in judicial retention elections (Pelander 1998, p. 711). 
Perhaps more troublingly, there is evidence that such elections remain marred by 
voter’s lack of knowledge about judicial candidates (Pelander 1998, p. 711). 
Evidence of uninformed voters abounds (Berch and Bass 2013, p. 940). For 
example, many voters continue to treat all judges on the ballot the same, voting 
either for or against all judges (Berch and Bass 2013, p. 940). This pattern is 
reflected in other jurisdictions.49 Moreover, it seems that even the voters who do 
differentiate between judges largely ignore evaluation recommendations (Berch and 
Bass 2013, p. 941). Griffith (1995, p. 62) suggests that there is little evidence to 
suggest a favourable report will influence these voters (see also Pelander 1998, p. 
709). Equally, there is strong evidence that voters will even routinely ignore 
                                                 
46 Berch and Bass note, for example, the concern that the Commission is reluctant to vote that a judge 
‘Does Not Meet’ the performance standards (Berch and Bass 2014, p. 939). 
47 Spigelman notes that opinion surveys about quality are based on perceptions, and that such surveys 
‘are notoriously unreliable, particularly on matters about which the interviewees have limited 
understanding’ (Spigelman 2006, p. 78). 
48 Evidence of this practice is provided in the example given by Brody of the ‘hard-nosed’ judge who was 
deliberately appointed to bring order to the criminal docket only to be given a low rating for being hard-
nosed (Brody 2000, p. 344-346). 
49 Griffin (1995, p. 62), for example, notes that approximately 30% of the electorate ‘routinely votes ‘no’ 
in judicial retention elections, no matter who the judge happens to be’, nor how glaring or effusive the 
Commission's evaluation of the judge is. See also Pelander (1998, p. 709). 
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negative findings.50 No matter how accurate the information provided by judicial 
evaluation programs is, unless that information is being actively used by voters in 
their electoral choices, those programs will be of little utility. Evidence of voting 
patterns illustrates a real concern as to the use of evaluation reports, giving good 
reasons to doubt the efficacy of even well-implemented programs. Where 
performance evaluation becomes disconnected from the overarching accountability 
mechanism of retention elections its use becomes unjustifiable.  
3. Potential for undue influence 
Finally, there remains the potential for the operation of performance evaluation 
programs to improperly influence judicial performance. While this is not a concern 
Berch notes in respect of Arizona, other commentators have certainly raised this 
spectre.51 The concern is that judges may alter their behaviour to unduly gain a 
favourable report, with the consequence that the evaluation programs may actively 
distort judicial performance thereby undermining the internal objectives of 
accountability. Moreover, while evaluation programs can provide the public with a 
sense of oversight and control over the judiciary, if the program is viewed as 
corrupt, slanted, or unfair, it existence may undermine public trust in the judiciary 
(Brody 2000, p. 335). Any perception of potential undue influence will diminish 
public confidence in the judiciary, undermining the external objective of judicial 
accountability. Judicial performance evaluation is a tool to aid the accountability 
mechanisms of retention elections. There is inevitably a cost in its use that may 
ultimately outweigh any benefit gained with respect to the overarching 
mechanism.52 If the cost of using performance evaluation programs, in terms of 
actual undue influence or the perception of such, outweighs any benefit to the 
operation of the accountability mechanism then its use cannot be justified.  
It can be seen that there is real concern over the efficacy, accuracy and justifiability 
of judicial performance evaluation in the context of judicial retention election. 
Ultimately though, these concerns may not illustrate problems with the tool of 
performance evaluation, but with the primary mechanism of retention elections.  
5.2.3. Critique of the primary mechanism 
There is growing concern that judicial retention elections may no longer be serving 
the accountability purpose for which they were originally developed (See Geyh 
2003, Tarr 2009): a form of ‘ballot box accountability’ whereby judges who do not 
perform their judicial role with excellence, competence, and integrity will not be 
retained. If retention elections did in fact operate in this way then they could 
provide a powerful means of motivating judges to pursue such qualities.  
However, there is evidence to suggest that judicial elections are increasingly, about 
politics and the attempt to influence judicial decision-making rather than judicial 
merit. This is notoriously illustrated by the removal of Penny White from the 
Tennessee Supreme Court following a concerted attack against her as a result of 
her participation in a majority decision on a death sentence appeal (See Anderson 
2001, p. 1378-1379, Brody 2008, p. 123-124).53 Such instances constitute a direct 
attack on judicial independence (Brody 2008, p. 124): arguably judicial elections 
                                                 
50 Paynter and Kearnes (2010, p. 943) note that in the six states they surveyed, there were 28 instances 
of judges receiving ‘Do Not Retain’ recommendations. Of these judges, 13 were not retained, while 15 
were retained. 
51 Griffin, for example, argues that so long as a judge’s right to remain a judge is dependent (or even 
only influenced) by the will of a committee of 10 to 15 other people, then ‘sooner or later judicial 
behaviour will be affected’ (Griffin 1995, p. 7). 
52 In this context, it is worth also considering the financial costs involved in operating formal judicial 
performance evaluation programs. Berch notes that Arizona’s program costs approximately $269,300 
annually, though notes that this figure provides only an estimation of time spent by court staff and does 
not factor in the countless hours spent by volunteers who serve on the Commission or on the self-
improvement teams (Berch and Bass 2014, p. 13). See also Pelander (1998, p. 706-707). 
53 Other notorious examples include the successful campaign against the retention of Chief Justice Rose 
Bird (together with justices Cruz Reynoso and Joseph Grodin) in California in 1986. 
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have become have the ‘primary vehicle’ for retaliation against judges on account of 
their decisions (Geyh 2003, p. 49). Where votes are influenced by the voters 
opinion of particular judicial decisions, there a potential for judicial elections to 
‘pervert the decision-making process it proposes to improve’ (Spigelman 2006, p. 
79). Judges may become incentivised to improperly alter their judicial decisions in 
order to promote their chances of being re-elected, potentially abandoning what 
they believe to be correct in favour of what they believe is popular. This is the very 
antithesis of what judicial accountability mechanisms are supposed to achieve.54  
It is improper for any person or interest group to attempt to unduly influence 
substantive judicial decision-making through retention elections.55 Such 
interference fundamentally challenges judicial independence. The judicial values of 
fierce independence and adherence to the law may sit uncomfortably with populist 
forms of accountability, yet this tension between majoritarianism and legalism 
ought not be quickly dismissed.56 This tension lies at the heart of any attempt to 
hold judges to account through electoral means. If we truly want ‘judges’ who are 
‘politically accountable to the political clamour of the moment’ then the decision-
makers we aspire to are not performing a judicial function (See Feltner 2008, p. 
179).57 If, instead, we want judges who aspire to the excellent performance of the 
judicial function, then populist-based accountability for judges should be feared and 
avoided (Kourlis and Singer 2008, p. 8). The purpose of judicial accountability 
remains the promotion of judicial quality and excellence. Though it may be 
unfashionable to say so, quality is, as Spigelman notes, ‘by its nature, not 
susceptible to democratic assessment’ (Spigelman 2006, p. 79).58 There are good 
reasons to suggest that retention elections no longer serve the purposes for which 
they were created (Tarr 2009, p. 632). 
I do not wish to fall into the trap of the outsider criticising a quintessentially 
American practice from afar. Instead, I raise these concerns to illustrate a 
fundamental limitation on the use of judicial performance evaluation programs. 
Where such programs exist to aid the performance of primary mechanisms of 
accountability, then no matter how well designed and implemented those 
programs, their utility will always remain restricted by the inherent limitations of 
that primary mechanism. If the primary mechanism is poorly suited to the 
promotion of the objectives of judicial accountability, then not even a perfect 
evaluation program can be justified on accountability grounds. The evidence of 
voting patterns suggests that retention elections are an ineffective means of 
motivating judges to perform their judicial role with excellence. Likewise that 
evidence suggests that too often the judicial competence of the judge is irrelevant 
to voters. In this context, retention elections provide minimal incentive to the judge 
to pursue excellence. Given the other distortive potential involved in this process, 
there may be good reason to doubt the utility of such elections. As a result, it 
would follow that judicial evaluation programs could not be justified by reference to 
their influence on retention election voting. The stream cannot rise above its 
source, and the utility of the tool will always remain limited by the ability of the 
primary mechanism to promote the objectives of judicial accountability. 
                                                 
54 These concerns are compounded by the rapid escalation of the money that is being poured into 
judicial election campaigns (See Brandenburg 2009, p. 373). This money creates new avenues by which 
judges can become improperly influenced by, or beholden to, external interests.  
55 As Brody notes, the basis upon which voters hold judges accountable ‘must not infringe upon their 
ability to decide matters based on the law’ (Brody 2008, p. 126). 
56 Brody rightly identifies this tension: ‘Making anti-majoritarian decisions, developing innovative 
practices and procedures, and standing by one's beliefs – all qualities we want from our judges – can 
make a judge liable to electoral challenges based on unfair characterization, innuendo, and attack by 
special interests’ (Brody 2004, p. 168). 
57 As Feltner notes, if we want such ‘politically accountable’ decision-makers it may be better to have a 
legislative body, which represents constituencies of the public, vote on the resolution of specific 
controversies between litigants’ (Feltner 2008, p. 179). 
58 Spigelman notes that ‘quality is hard to judge. It requires knowledge and experience’ (Spigelman 
2006, p. 79). 
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5.3. Performance evaluation and judicial professional development  
Finally, judicial performance evaluation can operate as an effective aid for 
structured judicial professional development programs. As the instrumental end of 
judicial accountability is not to ‘hold to account’ judges, but to promote judicial 
integrity and the excellent performance of the judicial function, professional 
development programs can be effective mechanisms of judicial accountability. The 
opportunity for meaningful self-reflection and supported improvement provided by 
such processes can promote the objectives of accountability. The internal objectives 
of accountability, of promoting judicial integrity and the pursuit of judicial 
excellence, are effectively served by programs directly designed to educate judges 
and encourage self-improvement. Likewise, knowledge of such programs gives the 
public good reason to have confidence in the ongoing competence and quality of 
the judiciary.  
Of course, there is a legitimate expectation that judges, as professionals, will 
possess a well-developed capacity for independent learning (Goldring 2003, p. 
216). This internal drive for improved judicial performance is a critical component 
of judicial integrity, and complements the honesty, good faith, and diligence judges 
are expected to bring to the bench (Aynes 1981, p. 255). However, there remains a 
significant skill-based aspect of judicial performance, the improvement of which can 
have a profound impact on the quality of justice and the overall efficacy of the 
judiciary (Aynes 1981, p. 255). Well-structured and organised development 
programs aid the enhancement of those skills by providing an opportunity for self-
reflection and improvement (Warren 2011, p. 5). Such programs help judges 
internalise the standards of professional conduct expected of the judge, and invite 
judges to reflect whether they are fulfilling their professional obligations (Goldring 
2003, p. 219). 
5.3.1. The role of performance evaluation in informing professional 
development 
Judicial professional development is made difficult by the fact that in the normal 
course of their role judges receive little informed feedback on their judicial 
performance. The very nature of their work means that judges, particularly in the 
common law world, often work alone as individual decision-makers. They seldom 
have extensive external stimuli, and are ‘virtually unique’ in the paucity of feedback 
they receive on their professional performance (Goldring 2003, p. 217). While some 
review of substantive evaluation of decision-making is provided through appellate 
supervision, that system is ‘singularly ill fitted to provide constructive feedback to 
judges’ (Goldring 2003, p. 217). Existing conventions mean that judges’ peers do 
not observe them operating in a professional capacity, and are therefore in no 
position to provide feedback on their performance (Goldring 2003, p. 217). As Chief 
Justice Marilyn Warren of the Victoria Supreme Courts notes (Warren 2011, p. 5): 
‘...the unintended consequence of the environment in which we work is that we 
receive little or no formal feedback about how each of us perform the role. As 
judges, it is a very lonely and isolated life that we lead. We sit on the bench day in 
day out, and from the very beginning everyone is very polite in court. But no-one 
ever tells us how we are going, how we are performing. ... We have, as judges, no 
feedback.’  
Judicial performance evaluation programs can respond to this void by providing 
judges with reliable feedback that can materially assist in that process of 
professional development (Griffin 1995, p. 6): areas for improvement are identified, 
and areas of excellence recognised (Aynes 1981, p. 255). A well-implemented 
judicial performance evaluation program can address the problems of isolation or a 
lack of self-reflection (Haines 2010, p. 926) that can limit the ability of judges to 
hone their judicial skills. The feedback such programs provides can help judges 
make informed choices as a basis for self-improvement (Colbran 2001, p. 356), and 
allow the judge to become aware of perceived weakness without fear of public 
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embarrassment or retaliation (Haines 2010, p. 926). This feedback aids the internal 
drive to self-improvement, assisting the judge to achieve a higher degree of judicial 
competence. In doing so, performance evaluation strengthens the efficacy of the 
primary mechanism of accountability of the professional development programs, 
helping to improve the judiciary by fostering judicial self-development.59 
This potential for judicial performance evaluation programs to provide feedback for 
judicial self-development, thereby promoting the excellent performance of the 
judicial function, is well illustrated by the ‘Court Craft’ program implemented in 
Victoria. That program, described by Warren, complements a ‘360-degree feedback’ 
model with surveys and interactive training to provide detailed feedback to judges 
on their judicial performance and demeanour (See Warren 2011). The stated 
intention of the program is to provide an opportunity for judges to gain insight into 
their judicial performance in a way that enhances on-going opportunities for 
professional development (Warren 2011, p. 5). The program has been, Warren 
(2011, p. 6) argues, both a ‘delicate and very successful process’. That term 
‘delicate’ highlights that the success of the program is, as Warren (2011, p. 7) 
acknowledges, ‘undeniably linked to the fact that participation is on a voluntary 
basis and that it is a very affirming process.’ Such programs require judicial ‘buy-
in’: no matter how ‘accurate’ the feedback provided by an evaluation program, that 
program can only succeed in aiding professional self-development where the judges 
willingly embrace the program and utilise the information provided by it.  
5.3.2. Limitations and criticisms  
This critical need for ‘buy-in’ by the judiciary is a limitation inherent in any program 
of judicial performance evaluation for professional development purposes (Haines 
2010, p. 926). The degree to which a judge will benefit from such a program will 
depend greatly, if not entirely, on the judges’ attitude toward the process (Berch 
and Bass 2014, p. 937). Judges are human, and like all people dislike being judged 
and criticized (Paynter and Kearney 2010, p. 927). Not only can this lead to judges 
closing their mind to a useful source of feedback, but can develop into resistance to 
participation in such a program, which if wide spread, will seriously undermine the 
program.60 Other criticisms of the use of judicial performance evaluation for 
professional development purposes include issues of cost, confidentiality and undue 
influence. Firstly, such programs can be difficult and expensive to design and 
implement, consuming significant amounts of employee and organizational time 
(Paynter and Kearney 2010, p. 929). Secondly, there may be problems ensuring 
and maintaining the confidentiality and anonymity of respondents (Paynter and 
Kearney 2010, p. 929); without faith in the confidentiality of the process, any 
feedback is less likely to be honest and accurate. Thirdly, there is concern that any 
formalised judicial education program may potentially exert undue influence on 
judges through structural and systemic biases in teaching methodologies. However, 
in contrast to situations where performance evaluation is linked to salary or 
promotion, the potential for gamesmanship appears minimal in a professional 
development context (Colbran 2001, p. 356).  
By understanding performance evaluation as a tool to aid the operation of 
mechanisms of judicial accountability, we are forced to think more clearly about the 
costs and benefits of the tool. Where evaluation is utilised for professional 
development purposes, those benefits will generally outweigh usage ‘costs’. 
Structured evaluation can provide meaningful and valuable feedback to judges 
                                                 
59 It should be recalled that this self-improvement focus was the purpose for which the ABA originally 
advocated for judicial performance evaluation and is, according to Berch and Bass, the most successful 
aspect of Arizona’s program (Berch and Bass 2014, p. 936-937); see also Pelander (1998, p. 647, 708). 
60 I note that for some judges of high integrity and competence, such programs may not accord with 
their own methods of development, and accordingly they will gain little from it. Not all judges will benefit 
from such programs, but there is a significant difference between an informed and reflective desire not 
to participate, and a defensive rejection of the program. 
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about their judicial performance,61 while the risks inherent in utilising judicial 
performance evaluation for professional development purposes appear significantly 
less than for other uses of the tool. The connection between the feedback role of 
such evaluation and the accountability objective of the professional development 
mechanisms is much more direct than in other uses of performance evaluation.  
6. Conclusions 
Over the last 40 years, the use of ‘judicial performance evaluation’ has grown from 
a radical idea to a familiar concept. It is now possible for judges and scholars of 
judicial studies from around the world to gather to meaningfully discuss this 
common phenomenon. Nevertheless, there remain distinct approaches to the 
methods of judicial performance evaluation and, perhaps more importantly, the 
purposes for which those programs are used.  
In this article I have argued that there is a common weave that links together these 
distinct practices in both the form and purpose of judicial performance evaluation. 
By its form ‘judicial performance evaluation’ refers to the use of structured, tightly-
regulated and repeatable methods to measure judicial performance to provide 
feedback on a judge’s performance in a way that does not depend upon mere 
opinion of a few (often partial) individuals. The common aim of that measurement 
is to promote the objectives of judicial accountability. In this article I argue that to 
understand the modern practice of judicial performance evaluation, and the 
limitations of evaluation programs, it is necessary to understand the relationship 
between such programs and the principles of judicial accountability.  
6.1. A Conceptual framework for analysing judicial performance evaluation 
programs 
A conceptual analysis of the purposes and limitations of judicial performance 
evaluation has largely been lacking in the literature. For the most part, academics 
have been content to examine and critique particular programs in a specific 
jurisdiction (compare, for example, Spigelman 2002, 2006, and Drummond 2001a, 
2001b, with Griffin 1995, Colbran 2002b, and White 2002). Even where there is 
quality comparative analysis (See Mohr and Contini 2007, Contini and Mohr 2007), 
it largely focuses on particular uses of performance evaluation. This focus on 
discrete mechanisms and on particular jurisdictions means that, by and large, 
systematic assessments of judicial performance evaluation programs, and their 
impact on judicial accountability and independence, have been lacking (Brody 2008, 
p. 120). At a deeper level, the ability to analyse the impact of judicial performance 
evaluation on judicial accountability has been severely hampered by the paucity of 
quality theory with respect to judicial accountability itself.  
I begin, therefore, by examining the concept of judicial accountability. I argue that 
judicial accountability is an instrumental concept that operates for the limited 
purpose or promoting the excellent performance of the judicial function. This 
involves both internal aspects (promoting actual judicial integrity, excellence and 
quality), and external aspects (promoting public confidence in, and a reputation for, 
such values). Mechanisms of judicial accountability can promote these objectives in 
a variety of ways but are bound by this instrumental nature; where their operation 
undermines the excellent performance of the judicial function their use cannot be 
justified.  
                                                 
61 While it may put it too strongly to suggest that without judicial performance evaluation judges ‘are not 
in a position to objectively evaluate their own performance and skills’(Colbran 2002b, p. 239, 2003b, p. 
68) this feedback clearly has the potential to support more effective judicial professional development. It 
should be noted that Colbran’s assertion makes a number of questionable assumptions, including that 
judicial performance evaluation is in some way ‘objective’ and that this is desirable; that evaluation 
programs are capable of delivering such ‘objective’ feedback; and thirdly, that only formalised process of 
JPE are capable of deliver such feedback. 
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Judicial performance evaluation operates to aid the operation of various primary 
mechanisms of judicial accountability. By providing detailed feedback on judicial 
performance, these primary mechanisms can operate more effectively. However, 
there is a cost in the use of the tool of evaluation, and that cost must be balanced 
against any gains provided. Moreover, the derivative nature of judicial performance 
evaluation means that no matter how well designed or implemented a program 
may be, its utility will always remain limited by the overarching accountability 
mechanisms it serves.  
6.1.1. application of framework 
I then go on to illustrate the utility of this approach by critically analysing three of 
the more significant roles for which judicial performance evaluation is utilised: 
judicial promotions; retention elections; and professional development. The first 
issue illustrated how the process of measuring performance can operate as an 
improper influence on judicial decision-making, distorting the very performance the 
mechanisms is supposed to promote. That threat was particularly acute in the 
program described by Riedel (2014) which explicitly avoids any attempt to assess 
substantive judicial performance. The use of proxies creates the potential for 
gamesmanship that frustrates the pursuit of excellence in judicial performance at 
the heart of judicial accountability. The apparent ‘objectivity’ of performance 
evaluation may undermine the very mechanism of merit promotion it is supposed to 
support. The inverse problem arose in the context of judicial retention elections, 
where the evidence suggests that far too often the voters will disregard or ignore 
the evaluative feedback provided to them. Irrespective of the quality of the 
evaluation program, the limitations inherent in the primary mechanism of retention 
elections will fundamentally restrict the utility and impact of the program. 
Performance evaluation remains a tool, limited by the overarching mechanism it 
serves. Finally, the professional development context shows the benefits that can 
arise where the tool of performance evaluation harmonises with the accountability 
objectives of the primary mechanism. The feedback for professional development 
provided by voluntary evaluation programs with a high degree of ‘buy-in’ can 
provide substantial benefits for low functional costs. Such evaluation effectively 
promotes the objectives of judicial accountability with minimal drawbacks.62 
I use these examples not to assert the appropriateness or otherwise of a particular 
use of judicial performance evaluation in a given particular jurisdiction. Rather 
these examples illustrate the way in which a clear conceptual framework enables 
such issues to be answered. I argue that by conceptualising judicial performance 
evaluation as a derivative tool that operates to promote mechanisms of judicial 
accountability, we are far better placed to understand the strengths and 
weaknesses, purposes and limitations of such evaluation.63 The examples I give 
help to illustrate the utility of this approach. There may indeed be other 
accountability purposes served by performance evaluation, particularly for matters 
of judicial and court management.64 Alternatively, it may be argued that judicial 
performance evaluation operates directly as a mechanism of accountability, 
promoting the external objectives of accountability of public confidence merely by 
                                                 
62 Indeed, it has been suggested that in a context like Australia, judicial self-improvement is the only 
appropriate use for judicial performance evaluation (Colbran 2001, p. 336). I do not make such bold 
normative claims in this paper. While there are good reasons for accepting such a claim, it goes beyond 
what I have demonstrated here. 
63 Moreover, this clarity can assist in designing the final form and mechanics of any program of judicial 
performance evaluation. As Aynes notes where ‘the goal of a performance evaluation program is to 
assist in the professional development and improvement of sitting judges, a totally different 
methodology may be necessary than where the purpose is for promotion or election’ (Aynes 1981, p. 
269). 
64 This can operate at either the level of the allocation of resources to various courts and court offices or 
in some cases for the remuneration of personnel (Contini and Mohr 2007, p. 37). 
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the act of measurement and public knowledge of that measurement.65 Such 
alternative uses do not challenge the framework I have developed, but rather invite 
its further application.  
6.2. Final observations on evaluation programs 
The purpose of this article is to examine the analysis of judicial performance 
evaluation programs from a different angle. I do not, here, comment on the 
appropriateness of particular proxies or mechanisms. Rather, I address the largely 
unspoken prior question: why are we evaluating at all? This invites us to think 
critically about judicial performance evaluation programs, focusing on their 
objectives, purposes and effects rather than simply their mechanics. The modern 
concept of judicial performance evaluation is, at its core, about the measurement of 
judicial conduct, performance and behaviour. The process of measurement invites 
several questions, including: 
1) What is the behaviour or value to be measured?  
2) Can the behaviour or value be meaningfully measured?  
3) Can that measured value serve a given purpose?  
4) What are the costs of measurement? and  
5) Does the measurement alter that which is measured, distorting the 
underlying practice? 
The framework I have developed helps answer some of these questions: the first 
three of these issues help us to think about what is measured and why. The final 
issues look at the implications of that measurement. Underlying this is a question 
regarding the meaningfulness of measuring judicial performance at all. Such 
measurement aims to replace subjective assessment with more ‘objective’ 
evaluative criteria. Judicial decisions are, however, dependent upon acts of 
judgement by the judge, upon unavoidable and genuine exercises of discretion. 
Subjectivity is arguably a necessary and unavoidable aspect of judicial evaluation. 
As Spigelman notes, justice and judicial performance may be one to those things 
that cannot be measured, only judged (Spigelman 2002, p. 25). Objectivity may 
not only be an illusion in this context,66 but attempts to pursue it may sideline 
opportunities to examine key aspects of, and motivations for, judicial 
performance.67  
Understanding the accountability purposes of performance evaluation highlights 
that the proper focus of judicial performance evaluation is on the excellent 
performance of the judicial function, not merely on those things that are readily 
measureable. This underlying accountability purpose not only guides and informs 
any attempt to answer these five questions, but more fundamentally helps to 
expose the proper purposes and limitations of judicial performance evaluation. 
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